We study the design of interventions to stabilize financial markets plagued by adverse selection. Our contribution is to analyze the information revealed by participation decisions. Taking part in a government program carries a stigma, and outside options are mechanism-dependent. We show that the efficiency of an intervention can be assessed by its impact on the market interest rate. The presence of an outside market determines the nature of optimal interventions and the choice of financial instruments (debt guarantees in our model), but it does not affect implementation costs.
George A. Akerlof (1970) shows how asymmetric information can create adverse selection and undermine market efficiency. Economic and legal institutions, such as auditors, underwriters, accountants, or used-car dealers, often emerge to limit adverse selection and allow markets to function. As a result, direct government interventions are usually unnecessary. If a market does collapse, however-presumably following the failure of the institutions designed to prevent the collapse in the first place-a government might want to intervene. This paper asks what form these interventions should take if the goal of policy is to improve economic efficiency with minimal cost to taxpayers.
We study an economy with borrowing and investment under asymmetric information. Firms must raise capital to take advantage of profitable investment opportunities, but also have private information about the value of their existing assets. Optimal financial contracts can only partially limit adverse selection, and inefficiencies occur because the safest borrowers, facing unfairly high interest rates, drop out of the market. Competitive lenders then rationally charge a high rate to the remaining borrowers, lending and investment are inefficiently low, and there is scope for a government intervention.
We characterize cost-minimizing interventions to improve lending and investment, and we propose implementations with standard financial contracts. The key novel aspect of our analysis is the interaction between the government's intervention and the borrowing terms that firms face in the market. Potential lenders rationally interpret participation decisions as signals of private information. Therefore, the rate at which non-participants borrow depends on who participates in the program. In equilibrium, participation decisions affect outside options through signaling, while outside options influence the cost of the program through the participation constraints. This feedback distinguishes our work from the existing mechanism-design literature, in which outside options are exogenous.
Several dimensions must be considered when designing an optimal program, from the selection of types to the nature of financial contracts. Interactions between these choices and the endogenous outside options make the problem quite complex. For instance, one might conjecture that the government should try to selectively attract the good types who drop out of the private market.
To do so, it might be optimal to offer different securities from the ones private lenders use. In this case, successful interventions could be cheap, or even profitable. Alternatively, if interventions are unavoidably costly, it might be important to minimize the number of participants in the program.
Finally, the government might be tempted to restrict access to private markets. Our analysis clarifies these conjectures.
Our model has the following features. All firms have investment opportunities with positive net present value. A firm's privately known type θ, drawn from some interval θ,θ , indexes the quality of its legacy assets and, therefore, determines the conditional distribution of its total income y. We assume that f (y|θ) satisfies the monotone hazard rate property. In this environment, the optimal contract between firms and private investors is a debt contract. A decentralized equilibrium is characterized by a cutoff θ D : types in θ, θ D invest, while types above θ D , faced with an unfairly high interest rate, forego investment. The lack of investment by types in θ D ,θ represents the welfare loss of adverse selection. The goal of the government is to increase investment while minimizing the cost of its intervention for taxpayers.
We obtain five main results. The first result is that, regardless of how the government designs its intervention, it cannot selectively attract the best types. An equilibrium with intervention is similar to the decentralized equilibrium, but with a higher investment cutoff θ T > θ D . Interventions that improve investment are always costly.
The second result is that the investment level achieved by an optimal program can be assessed simply by looking at the borrowing rate outside the program. To establish this result, we show that in any equilibrium, the best type investing θ T must weakly prefer borrow from the market than from the government. This implies a one-to-one mapping between the investment level achieved by any program and the borrowing market rate of non-participants.
The third result is that the actual size of a program is, to a large extent, irrelevant. In equilibrium, the market rate is pinned down by the average quality of non-participants through the break-even constraint of private lenders. This average quality must be good enough to sustain private lending beyond θ D and up to θ T . This requirement, however, is consistent with many different participation functions. For instance, there is a unique minimal program where the government attracts all the worst types (up to some threshold), and the market then faces a truncated distribution with a better average quality than in the decentralized equilibrium. There exists, however, a continuum of other programs that achieve the same target investment θ T , the same break-even market rate, and the same implementation cost. In some of these programs, all types below θ T might borrow from the government with positive probability.
The fourth result is that optimal implementation requires debt-like instruments. Implementation costs are at least as high as the rents that lower types obtain if they mimic θ T and borrow from the market. Reaching the minimum cost therefore requires that participation constraints bind simultaneously for all types. This is possible only if repayment functions are the same inside and outside the program. Since private investors use debt contracts, the government must employ debt-like securities. The government may lend directly or it may guarantee privately issued debt.
Other instruments (e.g., equity injections) are more expensive because participation constraints cannot bind for several types at once.
Our fifth result is that, even if the government could shut down the private markets, this would not lower the cost of implementation. This is because the cost of an optimal intervention is equal to the rents that all investing types obtain by mimicking type θ T . Since θ T is, by definition, indifferent between investing and not, its payoff is the same whether or not there is a market.
Finally, we extend our benchmark model by relaxing the assumption that investment opportunities are the same for all types. Our results continue to hold with asymmetric information about new opportunities. When we allow banks to choose the riskiness of their investments after they opt into the program, we find that moral hazard is mitigated by the endogenous response of the private interest rate, and can be eliminated by indexing the terms of the government's program to that rate. ernments stepped in with large-scale interventions, but there was no consensus about exactly which programs should be offered. 2 Finally, there is ample evidence that borrowing from the government 1 Heider, Hoerova & Holthausen (2008) discuss the collapse of the interbank market. Duffie (2009) discusses the OTC and repo markets. In the OTC market, the range of acceptable forms of collateral was dramatically reduced,"leaving over 80% of collateral in the form of cash during 2008," while the "repo financing of many forms of collateralized debt obligations and speculative-rate bonds became essentially impossible." Gorton (2009) explains how the complexity of securitized assets created asymmetric information about the size and location of risk. Investors and banks were unable to agree on prices for legacy assets or for bank equity. The classic references on financial crises (Walter Bagehot 1873, Oliver M. W. Sprague 1910) do not discuss the role of asymmetric information explicitly.
Discussion of the literature
2 In the U.S., the original TARP called for $700 billion to purchase illiquid assets but was transformed into a Capital Purchase Program (CPP) to invest $250 billion in U.S. banks. As of August 2009, $307 billion of outstanding debt was issued by financial companies and guaranteed by the FDIC. The treasury also insured $306 billion of Citibank's (for banks), or from the IMF (for countries) carries a stigma (Stavros Peristiani 1998 , Jenny Corbett & Janet Mitchell 2000 , Janet Mitchell 2001 , Craig H. Furfine 2005 .
Our paper builds on the rich literature that studies asymmetric information, following Akerlof (1970 ), A. Michael Spence (1974 , and Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss (1981) . It is useful to relate our work to the particular branch that deals with security design. Stewart C Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf (1984) argue that debt can be used to reduce mispricing when issuers have private information. Michael Brennan & Alan Kraus (1987) consider various financing strategies to reduce adverse selection. Technically, we build on the contribution of David Nachman & Thomas Noe (1994) , who clarify the conditions under which debt is optimal in a multi-type capital-raising game. Peter DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie (1999) also discuss the optimality of debt when the security design occurs before private information is learned.
Our paper is also related to the literature on government interventions to improve market outcomes. Some of the literature deals specifically with bank bailouts. Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang (2004) argue that the government can bail out banks in distress because it can provide liquidity more effectively than private investors can. Douglas Diamond & Raghuram Rajan (2005) show that bank bailouts can backfire by increasing the demand for liquidity and causing further insolvency. Douglas Diamond (2001) emphasizes that governments should bail out only the banks that have specialized knowledge about their borrowers. Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries (1999) show that bailouts can be designed so as not to distort ex-ante lending incentives. Efficient bailouts are studied by Thomas Philippon & Philipp Schnabl (2009) 3 There is also an extensive literature on how government interventions can improve risk sharing. For excellent surveys, see Narayana Kocherlakota (2006) , Mikhail Golosov, Aleh Tsyvinski & Ivan Werning (2006) , and Narayana Kocherlakota (2009) . Farhi, Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski (2009) , building on Charles J. Jacklin (1987) , show how liquidity requirements can improve equilibrium allocations. The critical difference is that, in our paper, government intervention affects market conditions through signaling and adverse selection.
The most closely related papers are Enrico Minelli & Salvatore Modica (2009) and Jean Tirole (2010) . Minelli & Modica (2009) , building on Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) , model the intervention as a sequential game between the government and a monopolistic lender. Like us, Tirole (2010) emphasizes the role of endogenous outside options. Our models assume different frictions that prevent the efficient financing of new projects. Tirole (2010) assumes moral hazard in addition to adverse selection, while we follow Myers & Majluf (1984) and assume that returns of old and new projects are fungible. Some results are, nonetheless, similar. For example, Tirole (2010) also finds that the government cannot selectively attract good types, and that it does not benefit from shutting down private markets. Another difference between our work and both Minelli & Modica (2009) and Tirole (2010) is that we allow for continuous payoffs (as opposed to binary ones). This allows us to discuss security design. We present our model in Section 1. In Section 2, we characterize its decentralized equilibria.
We formally describe the mechanism-design problem in Section 3. In Section 4, we characterize lower bounds on the costs of government interventions. Those bounds can actually be achieved by simple, common interventions, as we show in Section 5. Section 6 discusses extensions, and we close the paper with some final remarks in Section 7.
The Model
Our model has three dates, t = 0, 1, 2, and a continuum of firms with pre-existing 'legacy' assets.
The firms start with private information regarding the quality of their legacy assets and receive the opportunity to make a new investment at time 1. The government can offer various programs at time 0, and firms can borrow and lend in a competitive market at time 1. We assume that all agents are risk-neutral and we normalize the risk-free rate to zero. The timing of the model is depicted in Figure 1. insert Figure 1 here
Initial assets and cash balance
Firms start with cash and legacy assets, and no pre-existing liabilities. Cash is liquid and can be kept, invested or lent at time 1. Let c t denote the cash holdings at the beginning of period t. All firms start with c 0 in cash, but c 1 can differ from c 0 if the government injects cash in the firms at time 0. Cash holdings cannot be negative: c t ≥ 0 for all t.
The book value of legacy assets, A, is known, but some assets may be impaired, and the eventual payoff at time 2 is the random variable a ∈ [0, A]. Firms privately know their type θ, which determines the conditional distribution of the value of legacy assets f a (a|θ). Types are drawn from a compact set Θ ⊂ θ,θ with cumulative distribution H (θ).
Investment and borrowing
Firms receive investment opportunities at time 1. Investment requires the fixed amount x and delivers a random payoff v at time 2. Firms can borrow at time 1 in a competitive market. After learning its type θ, a firm offers a contract l, y l to the competitive investors, where l is the amount raised from investors at time 1, and y l is the schedule of repayments to investors at time 2. Without government intervention, the funding gap of the firms is l 0 ≡ x − c 0 . The government can reduce the funding gap with cash injections, denoted by m. In this case, c 1 = c 0 + m, and the firm only needs to borrow l = l 0 − m. We use the generic notation l for the amount actually raised from private investors. In period 2, the cash balance of the firm is c 2 (i) = c 1 + l − x · i, and its total income is
where i ∈ {0, 1} is a dummy for the decision to invest at time 1. Total firm income at time 2 depends on the realization of the two random variables a and v. This total income will be split among initial owners, new lenders, and (potentially) the government.
Assumptions
For simplicity, we assume in our benchmark model that all firms receive the same investment opportunities. The random payoff v is distributed on [0, V ] according to the density function
be the expected value of v. To make the problem interesting, we assume that new projects have positive NPV and that firms need to borrow in order to invest:v > x > c 0 . We further assume that contracts can be written only on the total income of the firm at time 2:
Assumption A1: The only observable outcome is total income τ 2 defined in equation (1).
Under Assumption 1, repayment schedules can be contingent on total income τ 2 but not on a and v separately. If a firm does not invest, it keeps c 2 = c 1 , and its total income at time 2 is a + c 1 . If it invests, it ends up with c 2 = 0 and total income a + v. 4 We define total income conditional on 4 It will become clear that the government never finds it optimal to inject cash into the banks beyond m = l0.
investment as: y ≡ a + v. The distribution of y, which is the convolution of f a and f v , is denoted by f . Since f a depends on θ, so does f . Let Y denote the support of y. We assume that f (y|θ) satisfies the strict monotone hazard rate property:
Assumption A2: For all (y, θ) ∈ Y × Θ, f (y|θ) > 0, and
Total income is used to repay the loans taken at time 1 according to a schedule y l . When the government intervenes, the firm also might need to repay the government, according to a schedule y g . Our last assumption is to impose a monotonicity condition on the repayment schedules.
Assumption A3: The repayment schedules y l and y g of private lenders and of the government are non-decreasing in τ 2 .
Let us briefly discuss the main features of our model. We introduce a binary investment technology to simplify the strategy space of firms, but it is easy to extend the model to partial investment, for instance, by having i ∈ {0, 1/2, 1}. In order to stay close to the workhorse model of Myers & Majluf (1984) , we initially assume that all firms receive the same investment opportunities. In this context, A1 makes private information relevant by preventing the parties from contracting directly on v (by spinning off the new investment, for example). As an extension, we introduce private information on v in Section 6. Assumption A2 defines a natural ranking among types regarding the quality of their legacy assets, from the worst type θ to the best typeθ. The strict inequalities in A2 are not crucial, but they simplify some of the proofs. We allow for a general set of types Θ because, while much intuition can be obtained with just two types, the implementation results are somewhat special for the two-type case, as we explain in Section 5. Assumption A3 has been standard in the literature on financial contracting since Robert Innes (1990) and Nachman & Noe (1994) . It renders optimal contracts more realistic by effectively smoothing sharp discontinuities in repayments, and it can be formally justified by the possibility of hidden trades. 5
Equilibria without Interventions
Because the credit market is competitive and investors are risk-neutral, in any candidate equilibrium, the expected repayments to the lenders must be at least the size of the loan
where I denotes the information set of the private lenders at the time they make the loan. Under symmetric information, investment decisions would have been independent of the quality of legacy assets, and all firms would invest sincev ≥ x. The symmetric-information allocation is an equilibrium under asymmetric information when firms can issue risk-free debt. By contrast, adverse selection can occur when new investments are risky and when there is significant downside risk on legacy assets.
Contracting game
The contracting game is potentially complex because the kind of security a firm offers might signal its type. Under assumptions A1 to A3, however, it is a standard result that all firms that invest offer the same security, and this security is a debt contract. 6 The intuition is that bad types want to mimic good types, while good types seek to separate from bad types. Contracts with high repayments for low income realizations are relatively more attractive for good types than for bad types. This is the core idea of Myers & Majluf (1984) in a model with two types, extended by Nachman & Noe (1994) to an arbitrary set of types.
Equilibria without government intervention
We have explained above that all investing firms offer the same debt contract. Our next step is to characterize the set of firms that actually invest. Let r be the (gross) interest rate at which firms borrow. We can define the expected repayment function for type θ as:
For a given θ, the function ρ (θ, rl) is increasing in the face value rl. Under symmetric information, the fair interest rate r * θ on a loan l to a firm with type θ is implicitly given by l ≡ ρ (θ, r * θ l). Since ρ (θ, rl) is increasing in θ, the fair rate is decreasing in θ for any given l. With private information, however, the interest rate cannot depend explicitly on θ, and better types end up facing an unfair rate. This is the source of adverse selection.
Without government intervention, firms need to borrow l = l 0 = x − c 0 . Given a market rate r, a type θ wants to invest if and only if
There are several ways to obtain this result. One is to let each bank offer one contract and solve the issuance/signaling game. Nachman & Noe (1994) show in Theorem 5 that the unique equilibrium is pooling on the same debt contract as long as the distribution of payoffs can be ranked by hazard rate dominance (A2). Another way to obtain the result is to follow Roger B. Myerson (1983) and let banks offer a menu of securities in a first stage (see, also, Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole (1992) ). The inscrutability principle then ensures that no signaling occurs during the contract-proposal phase, and we can focus on one incentive-compatible menu. Standard design arguments can then be used to show that, under A1-A3, the best menu specifies the same debt contract for all types that invest.
condition is equivalent to 7v
The term ρ (θ, rl 0 ) − l 0 measures the informational rents paid by the firm. The rents are zero when the rate is fair. The information cost is positive when r > r * θ and negative (a subsidy) when r < r * θ . When informational rents are too large, firms might decide not to invest.
Since the right-hand side of equation (4) is increasing in θ, if θ wants to invest at rate r, any type below θ also wants to invest at that same rate. The set of investing types is, therefore, [θ,θ] , and the marginal typeθ is defined byv
The borrowing rate depends on the market's perception about the mix of firms that invest. Let h (.|1) describe the market's beliefs about the type of firms that borrow to invest. Investors' beliefs must be consistent with Bayes' rule: H (θ|1) = H (θ) /H θ if θ ∈ θ,θ , and 0 otherwise. Finally, the rate r must satisfy the zero-profit condition for private investors:
Proposition 1 The efficient outcome is sustainable without government intervention if and only if
there is a borrowing rate r such that (4) and (6) hold forθ =θ. All other equilibria haveθ ∈ (θ,θ) and are inefficient.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. The potential for adverse selection exists because the investment condition (4) is more likely to hold for worse types than for better types. 8 Multiple equilibria are possible because of the endogenous response of the interest rate. 9 Let r D denote the lowest interest rate that can be supported without government intervention, and let θ D be the corresponding threshold. The best decentralized equilibrium r D , θ D depends on c 0 and on the prior distribution of types.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine cases in which the efficient outcome is not sustainable as a decentralized equilibrium-i.e., θ D <θ. It is clear that higher cash levels increase θ D and improve economic efficiency. Therefore, governments might seek to inject liquidity into the firms.
Our goal is to design the most cost-effective interventions that achieve a given level of investment.
We do so formally in the next sections.
Mechanism Design with a Competitive Fringe
In this section, we present the government's objective and describe the mechanism-design problem.
Without intervention, the best equilibrium is (r D , θ D ) described above. The government's goal it to find the cheapest possible way to implement any given level of investment. 10 We denote the cost of a government program by Ψ. While the government's objective is straightforward, the mechanismdesign problem is non-standard because we assume that private markets remain open. The market rate for non-participating firms, then, depends on the mechanism the government uses because participation decisions convey information about private types. This interrelationship does not exist in standard mechanism design, where outside options are independent from the mechanism. 11
We refer to our model as mechanism design with a "competitive fringe."
Government's strategy
A government program P is a menu of contracts. The revelation principle applies and we can, without loss of generality, consider programs with one contract per type. 12 A contract specifies the cash m injected at time 1 and the schedule of payments y g received by the government at time 2.
A generic program, therefore, takes the form:
Firms' strategy A firm's strategy consists of a participation decision and an investment decision as a function of its type. At time 0, after the announcement of the government's program, each firm chooses a contract in P or opts out by choosing O. We allow firms to randomize their participation decisions. At time 1, given its type and its realized participation decision, each firm decides whether or not to invest:
The choice of a government contract in P is observed by the market and induces a private lending contract l θ , y l θ . If a firm of type θ chooses a contract m θ , y g θ designed for θ , its cash becomes 10 In a general equilibrium model, one could-after the cost minimization-solve for the optimal level of investment. We do not study this second stage here. Rather, we characterize the cost-minimizing intervention for any particular level of investment the government might want to implement.
11 In common agency problems, the interrelationship of the design problems is more complex since both principals that offer contracts have bargaining power. In our paper, the principal's (the government's) mechanism induces a competitive market's response.
12 In our model firms are ex-ante identical, so the government offers one menu. Otherwise the government should condition on observable characteristics, such as size, or leverage, and our results would apply after this conditioning.
13 This covers any program based on equity payoffs (common stock, preferred stock, warrants, etc.), as well as all types of direct lending and debt-guarantee programs. The case of asset purchases can be analyzed by allowing y g θ to depend on a. We discuss this extension in Section 6. c 1 = c 0 + m θ . If it invests, it must then borrow l θ = x − c 0 − m θ from the private market, and its expected payoff is:
If it does not invest, its expected payoff is V θ,
the firm opts out of the government program, it has the option to borrow in the private market at an interest rater. The outside option of a type θ firm is, therefore,
Competitive Fringe
Regardless of whether a firm opts in or out, the interest rate at which it borrows must satisfy the break-even condition of competitive lenders in equation (2). The information set I contains the equilibrium strategies of the firms-the participation and investment mappings-and the observed choices-the particular contract in P and the decision to demand a loan of size l. 14 The loan is l 0 = x − c 0 for firms opting out, and l 0 − m θ for firms opting in and choosing the contract designed for θ.
Equilibrium Conditions
Fix a government intervention and market rater for non-participating firms. Let Θ P,1 denote the set of types that participate and invest, and let Θ P,0 denote the types that participate but do not invest. Define Θ P = Θ P,1 ∪ Θ P,0 . Similarly, we can define Θ O,1 (respectively Θ O,0 ) to be the corresponding non-participating sets of types, and Θ O = Θ O,1 ∪ Θ O,0 . In order to have an equilibrium, we must have:
• For i ∈ {0, 1} and θ ∈ Θ P,i , V (θ, θ, i) ≥ max V θ, θ , j ,Ṽ (θ,r) , for j ∈ {0, 1} and
• For all θ ∈ Θ O ,Ṽ (θ,r) ≥ V θ, θ , j for j ∈ {0, 1} and θ ∈ Θ P , and
These conditions summarize the incentive, investment and participation constraints for both participating and non-participating firms.
Private lenders must expect to break even, and their beliefs must be consistent with the equilibrium behavior of the firms. For instance, if H O,1 denotes the market's perception about the distribution of firm types that choose to invest alone, the outside rater must satisfy
Similar conditions must hold for firms that opt in and borrow l θ = x − c 0 − m θ . Finally, the resource constraint y l (y) + y g (y) ≤ y must hold for all contracts. In what follows, we, without loss of generality, restrict our attention to interventions where the government receives junior claims-i.e.,
where new lenders are paid first according to y l θ (y) = min (y, r θ l θ ). 15 To sum up, the design problem is complex because the participation decision is influenced by the non-participation payoffs that depend on the market reaction, which is, in turn, endogenous to the mechanism. In Section 4, we characterize the set of feasible interventions and derive lower bounds on their costs. In Section 5, we show that these bounds are actually achieved by realistic and commonly used interventions.
Cost-Minimizing Interventions
In this section, we study feasible interventions and derive lower bounds for their costs. We analyze interventions where the competitive fringe is active-i.e., where some firms invest without the government's assistance. When the competitive fringe is active, the marker rater is pinned down by (9). The case where the competitive fringe is completely inactive-i.e., when Θ O,1 = ∅-is discussed in Section 5.
Feasible Interventions
Any firm opting out of the program can borrow in the market at rater. This rate defines a marginal typeθ (r) for which condition (4) holds with equality. The government knows that the outside option of any type belowθ is to invest, while the outside option of any type aboveθ is to do nothing. We will establish that the government cannot selectively attract better types by showing that in all feasible interventions, the types that invest with the help of the government are worse thanθ.
15 To see this, imagine a program where the government has some senior claimsỹ , and the cost to the government is unchanged.
We first introduce some notation and establish an important building block of our analysis in Lemma 1. Firms that participate and invest receive income y − y l θ − y g θ . The difference between inside and outside payoffs conditional on investment in both cases is then: γ θ (y) ≡ min (y,rl 0 ) − min (y, r θ l θ ) − y g θ (y) . From the participation constraint V (θ, θ, 1) ≥Ṽ (θ,r) of investing types, we then obtain:
The following Lemma establishes a Single Crossing Property that plays a central role in our analysis.
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 says that if a type prefers the strategy 'opt-in-and-invest' to the strategy 'investalone,' then all types below it have the same preference. In other words, irrespective of the way the government intervenes (so long as repayments to the government increase in the firms' total income at time 2), if some type prefers to invest with the help of the government, rather than investing alone, all worse types want to do the same. This result is driven by the same forces that cause the original market failure-namely, that good types expect to repay relatively more than bad types.
An important subtlety, however, is that what matters is the difference in expected payments inside or outside the program, both of which are increasing in θ. An additional complication is that the function γ θ (y) is not monotonic. It is typically positive for low values of y and then decreasing. The key is that it can switch sign only once, for some income realizationŷ. This explains why first-order stochastic dominance is not enough and why we need conditional stochastic dominance (or hazardrate dominance) in A2. We can then apply stochastic dominance conditional on income being more (or less) thanŷ, and obtain our result. The interesting point is that A2 is also the necessary and sufficient condition for debt to be optimal in the capital-raising game under asymmetric information (Nachman & Noe 1994) .
Lemma 1 has important implications. First, as long as some firms invest without the government's help, no type aboveθ (r) invests.
Proposition 2 When the competitive fringe is active, the set of investing firms is contained in the interval θ,θ (r) .
Proof. For non-participating types (θ ∈ Θ O ), the Proposition follows from the definition of θ (r). For participating types, we argue by contradiction. Suppose that there is a participating type θ strictly aboveθ (r) that invests-that is, θ ∈ Θ P,1 . Because θ >θ (r), we have that
Together, these two inequalities imply that E [γ θ (y)|θ] > 0. From Lemma 1, we then know that E [γ θ (y)|θ] > 0 for all types θ < θ. Therefore, θ,θ (r) ⊂ Θ P,1 and Θ O,1 ⊂ θ (r) ,θ , but this contradicts the definition ofθ (r), which says that types aboveθ (r) do not invest at the market rater.
Proposition 2 shows that no type aboveθ (r) will invest, and it is reminiscent of the standard adverse-selection unraveling result. In other words, the government cannot eliminate adverse selection. It can only limit the unraveling.
The key point to understand is that, in equilibrium, the government cannot attract a type abovê θ (r) and make this type invest. The reason is that, as shown in Lemma 1, all types worse than θ (r) would choose to mimic this type rather than go to the market. But, then, private lenders would anticipate lending only to types aboveθ (r) and would rationally charge a low rate, inducing investment beyondθ (r), who, therefore, could not be the marginal type. Hence, irrespective of the intervention, the best investing type is still willing to be financed by the market.
Proposition 2 also implies that we can, without loss of generality, focus on programs where only types belowθ participate in the government program. To see why, imagine that a type θ > θ (r) participates. We know that this type does not invest and must get at least its outside option.
But, then, the government can simply have this type drop out (by charging an infinitesimal fee, for instance). This does not affect the outside market rate because θ does not invest. Therefore, we have the following corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 Without loss of generality, only types belowθ (r) participate in the government's program: Θ P ⊂ θ,θ (r) .
Another important implication of Lemma 1 is that the government cannot design a program that attracts only good firms and induces them to invest. This suggests that all interventions that increase investment will be costly. This is, indeed, what we show next.
Minimum Cost of Intervention
In this section, we obtain a lower bound for the cost of interventions based on the minimal rents necessary to implement a given level of investment.
Corollary 1 argues that, when the competitive fringe is active, without loss, participating types, Θ P , are a subset of θ,θ (r) . Lemma 1 and the analysis of decentralized equilibria in Section 2, imply that the most attractive type to mimic for types in θ,θ (r) is the best type investing, θ (r). Moreover, Proposition 2 tells us that when the competitive fringe is active, the best type investingθ (r) invests without government help. Then, total rents paid to the firms with types in θ,θ (r) must be at least equal to the ones enjoyed from mimickingθ (r) , which are equal to θ (r) θ (l 0 − ρ (θ,rl 0 )) dH(θ). This last point says that if a type belowθ (r) mimics it, the rents will be equal to the ones that that type would obtain by investing alone in the market; hence, participation constraints are tight. The tricky issue is that, possibly, only some types in θ,θ (r) participate, and they could be doing so randomly. But (9) tells us that the market breaks even for non-participating firms thus all rents enjoyed by firms are paid by the government. Since rents are independent of the level of investment below typeθ (r) , an optimal program must induce investment for all types in θ,θ (r) . The equilibrium level of investment, before and after the government's intervention, is depicted in Figure 2. insert Figure 2 here Based on these two observations, we obtain Theorem 1, which describes the properties of feasible and optimal programs: Theorem 1 When the competitive fringe is active, feasible programs are characterized by an investment cutoffθ and an associated market rater. The cost of a feasible program cannot be less than the informational rents at rater
A program reaches the lower bound Ψ * (r) if and only if all types belowθ invest and γ θ (.) is identically zero for all types above the lowest type.
Proof. We have already argued that given an investment cutoffθ, the minimal cost is given by (11). From equation (10), we know that E [γ θ (y)|θ] ≥ 0 for all participating types. From Lemma 1, we further know that if γ θ (y) = 0 for some y ∈ Y and some type θ ∈ Θ P , then E γ θ (y)|θ > 0 for all θ < θ , implying a cost Ψ > Ψ * (r). For the cost to be Ψ * (r), we must, therefore, have γ θ (y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y and all θ ∈ Θ P,1 / {θ}.
Our analysis shows that cost minimization requires two things: making all types belowθ (r) invest (this maximizes the pie to be split), and making all participation constraints bind (this minimizes the rents to the firms). The lower bound of costs cannot be less than the informational rents at rater and is strictly positive for all interventions that increase investment-i.e., for all interventions that implementθ (r) > θ D , since θ D is the highest type for which the break-even constraint (6) holds. To go beyond θ D , the government is forced to pay information rents. Theorem 1 tells us that the number and types of participating firms matters only throughr. Hence, we have the following Corollary:
Corollary 2 For a given outside rater, the minimum cost does not depend on the participation in the program.
The intuition of this result is as follows: The market rate pins down the investment threshold (cf Proposition 2), which, in turn, pins down the unavoidable rents that the government needs to pay. There are many participation regimes that would lead to the same rate. The crucial feature is that the relative proportion of non-participating and investing types is such that it leads to the same break-even interest rate for the market.
More formally, let p (θ) ∈ [0, 1] be the probability of participation in the program for any type θ ∈ [θ,θ (r)]. Corollary 2 tells us that the actual participation rate of various types is irrelevant, so long as it leads to the same market rate. The equilibrium participation function p must be such that lenders break even on types opting out, when the rate isr-that is:
There are many participation functions p that induce the samer, as Figure 3 illustrates.
insert Figure 3 here
The minimal-sized program, depicted in Figure 3a , attracts the worst types-that is, p (θ) = 1 θ<θ p for all types below some cutoff θ p , and zero otherwise. The cutoff θ P must be such that (12) holds atr. At the other extreme, we can have p (θ) → 1 for all θ ∈ θ,θ (r) and Θ O,1 → ∅. 16
Any size between the minimal size and the limit where all investing types participate delivers the same exact cost and level of investment. So, any size between H (θ p ) and H θ (r) can be an equilibrium.
One way to grasp this result is the following. Start from the minimal intervention with size H (θ p ). Consider the types left out to invest alone-that is, types between θ p andθ (r). Now take a random sample of these types. By definition, the expected repayment for this random sample is exactly equal to the loan. This has two implications. First, removing the sample does not change the market rater. Second, adding the sample to the program does not change the expected cost for the government. Therefore, any random sample can be taken and any size between H (θ p ) and H θ (r) can be obtained. Actually, the range of possible participation is even greater than suggested by this explanation: One can have a program where some types below θ p do not participate, and participation schedules can obviously be discontinuous and contain holes.
All these programs would appear different, since participation would vary greatly, but their cost and investment level would be exactly the same.
The second important implication of Theorem 1 concerns the schedule of payments received by the government. The requirement that γ θ (.) be identically zero restricts the shape of the payoff functions that the government should offer, as explained in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Any feasible program that achieves investment θ,θ (r) at minimum cost Ψ * (r) must be such that, for all y ∈ Y and all θ ∈ Θ P,1 / {θ}
The intuition of this result is as follows: Theorem 1 tells us that reaching the lower bound on cost requires that, for all income realizations, the difference between repayments in and out of the program are the same (this way, the government makes sure that participation constraints bind for all types at the same time.) This implies that the shape of repayments in the program must be the same as that of repayments outside the program. Since the market employs debt contracts, in order to match the shape of repayments, the government must employ debt-like instruments.
Theorem 1 tells us what the government can hope to achieve, but the derivation of the lower bound takes into account only the participation constraints of the firms, ignoring the investment and incentive constraints. In the next section, we show how to design interventions that reach the lower bound and establish that (13) is achieved by debt-like instruments.
Implementation
We now study feasible interventions that reach the lower bound Ψ * (r). Corollary 3 shows that financial instruments that do not have the payoff structure of equation (13) Recall from Section 2 that the best decentralized equilibrium is characterized by θ D <θ. We can, then, think of the implementation as follows. The government chooses a target for aggregate
. 17 Through equation (5), this is equivalent to choosing a target R T for the market rate. For now, we takeθ and R T as given, and we study the minimum cost of implementinĝ θ = θ T . Implementation determines the structure of payoffs and implies an allocation of types to the sets Θ P,1 and Θ O,1 .
As explained in Corollary 2, the actual participation rate of various types is irrelevant so long as it leads to the same market rate. Given a participation function consistent withr = R T in the competitive fringe, the government still has several choices regarding the size of its loans (lend l 0 or less) and the security design (direct lending versus debt guarantees).
For simplicity in the following discussion, we consider a participation function p (θ) = 1 θ<θ p , depicted in Figure 3a . Then, θ p is uniquely pinned down by the break-even constraint
We start with the simplest program: direct lending.
Proposition 3 With an active competitive fringe, direct lending by the government of l 0 at rate R T uniquely implements the desired investment at the minimum cost.
Proof. In order to achieve the investment target θ T , the interest rate R T is such thatθ
The program corresponds to m θ = l 0 , l θ = 0, and y g θ (y) = min y, R T l 0 for all types. The incentive and investment constraints are clearly satisfied for all participating firms. Firms in Θ O,0 do not want to participate without investing since R T > 1. We cannot haver < R T since all firms would then drop out and the market rate would ber = r D > R T . We cannot haver > R T ; otherwise, Θ O,1 = ∅, which contradicts the fact that the competitive fringe is active. Hence, we must haver = R T . Then, γ θ (y) = 0 and
The direct-lending program implements the desired level of investment and achieves the minimum cost, which are the only outcomes the government cares about. The key points are that (i) at R T , target investment θ T is achieved; (ii) the incentive constraints are trivially satisfied since the government program offers one option for all types; and (iii) given thatr = R T is the market rate, participation constraints hold with equality for all participating types. With other programs, such as equity injections, the participation constraint binds only for the best participating type, while all others receive rents. 18
We now discuss equivalent implementations varying by the size of the loan and the security design:
Size of Loans: Consider a program where the government lends m < l 0 at a rate R < R T .
Participating types [θ, θ p ] must now borrow l u = l 0 − m on the market at a rate r that satisfies the zero-profit condition of the lenders:
Given θ p , equation (14) defines a schedule rl u strictly decreasing in m. Finally, the face value of the government loan Rm must satisfy the condition γ = 0-i.e., Rm + rl u (m) = R T l 0 . We cannot have R < 1; otherwise, some firms would take the cash without investing. The maximal program (analyzed in Proposition 3) corresponds to m = l 0 , rl u = 0, and R = R T . The minimal lending program m min is defined as the unique solution to rl u (m) + m − R T l 0 = 0; 19 that is,
Any outcome that can be implemented by lending l 0 at rate R T can also be implemented by a continuum of programs with m ∈ (m min , l 0 ] and R ∈ (1, R T ]. 20
18 The only exception is when only the worst type participates-i.e., ΘP = {θ}. With an atom-less distribution, such a program cannot increase investment, but if Pr (θ = θ) > 0, the government might choose a program where ΘP = {θ}. Then, optimality requires that E γ θ (y)|θ = 0, and this can be achieved in various ways. For instance, the government might offer cash m against a share α of equity returns. Opting into the program reveals the type to the lenders, and we must have E [min (y, r θ l θ ) |θ] = l0 − m. The condition E γ θ (y)|θ = 0 simply implies (1 − α) m − αE [y|θ] = ρ (θ,rl0) − l0. The parameters (m, α) pin down the generosity of the program and, therefore, in equilibrium, the outside rater. The more bad types that opt in, the lower isr, and the more costly the program becomes.
19 The solution exists because the function is continuous, negative at m = l0 since rl u (l0) = 0 and R T > 1, and positive at m = 0 since rl u (l0) ≥ R T l0. The solution is unique because ∂rl u ∂m < −1. To see why, notice that (14) implies
and (3) implies
Security Design: The government also has a choice of which debt instrument to use. In particular, direct-lending and debt-guarantee programs are equivalent. Instead of lending directly, the government can guarantee offers to guarantee new debt issuance up to an amount S (the size of the secured loan) for a fee φ paid up-front: m = −φS. Private lenders accept an interest rate of 1 on the guaranteed debt, so the budget constraint at time 1 becomes
where l u is the unsecured loan. The government has to make payments in case of default-that is, whenever a + v < S.
The debt guarantee and direct lending programs are equivalent when R = (1 − φ) −1 and m =
(1 − φ) S. In practice, central firms use direct lending, while governments seem to favor debt guarantees. A reason might be that, while equivalent in market-value terms, the programs differ in accounting terms since debt guarantees are contingent liabilities and do not appear as increases in public debt.
Implementation without Competitive Fringe
We now ask what happens if the government has the power to shut down the market. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 The cost of implementing θ T > θ D remains the same, Ψ * R T , even if the government shuts down private markets. The minimum cost Ψ * R T is achieved by direct government lending of l 0 at rate R T .
Proof. Notice, first, that it is still true (and, in fact, easier to show) that, regardless of the type of government program, only types below a threshold invest. The difference between participation and non-participation payoffs conditional on investing in the program is
The last term is increasing in θ. This immediately implies that the investment and participation set is θ, θ T and that θ T is the most attractive type to mimic. The type θ T is indifferent between investing and not investing, so its payoff is E a|θ T + c 0 . Let y This result is not obvious for two reasons: monopoly power and stigma. If the government is the sole lender, it has monopoly power and can set any lending rate (or choose any mechanism) without the fear that firms will drop out and borrow from the market. However, given that the equilibrium feasible investment and participation set is still θ, θ T , the government cannot avoid rewarding rents to all types θ, θ T who would otherwise mimic θ T . At an optimal intervention, regardless of whether or not there is a private market, this type is indifferent between investing and not investing, so it always earns E a|θ T + c 0 . Hence, the rents that the government must pay to induce investment θ, θ T are independent from the existence of a market. We conclude that the competitive fringe does not impose extra costs when the government uses an optimal implementation. 21
We summarize our implementation results in the following Theorem.
Theorem 2 Direct-lending and debt-guarantee programs uniquely implement any investment set of the form θ,θ (r) at minimum cost Ψ * (r). The cost of implementation does not change even if the government has the power to shut down private markets.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of menus, arguing that they are less robust than simple programs. Notice that the payoff structure of equation (13) applies to all interventions. Even with menus, the government must use debt-like instruments. Proposition 3 describes an optimal implementation using one debt contract. In the Appendix, we describe interventions with menus of debt contracts. While (non-trivial) menus can implement an optimal outcome, they can never do so uniquely. Alongside the equilibrium where each type chooses the correct contract, there is always an equilibrium where all the types pool on the contract designed for the worst type. Any non-trivial menu can, thus, overshoot its target and end up costing more than intended. This cannot happen with simple programs since all participating types already pool on the unique contract offered by the government. In this sense, simple programs are more robust than programs with menus.
21 The case of inactive fringe also arises when the market rate for non-participating firms is too high for investment outside the program. Our results apply to the case of an inactive fringe regardless of what causes the inactivity.
Extensions
In this section, we provide three important extensions to our main results. The first extension is to consider asymmetric information with respect to new investment opportunities. The second is to analyze asset purchases. The third is to consider the consequences of moral hazard in addition to adverse selection.
Asymmetric information about new loans
We have assumed so far that the distribution of v is independent of the firm's type. Let us now relax this assumption, while maintaining assumptions A2 and A3. We replace A1 by:
Our results hold under A1'. Firms continue to offer debt contracts, and expected repayments are still given by ρ (θ, rl). The investment condition, however, becomes E [v|θ] − x > ρ (θ, rl) − l for type θ. The significant difference is that it might potentially hold for good firms and not for bad firms. This does not, however, change the nature of the decentralized equilibrium: There is still some threshold below which types invest. Proposition 1 still holds, and the results in Sections 3 to 5 are unaffected. 22
Asset Purchases
Our benchmark model follows Myers & Majluf (1984) in assuming that cash flows are fungible.
Assumption A1 rules out contracts written directly on a. We can dispense with this assumption in two ways: by assuming asymmetric information with respect to v, as explained above, 23 or by allowing asset purchases, but not spin-offs. In other words, we can allow contracts that are increasing in both a and y. 24 One such contract is the purchase of Z units of face value of the legacy assets. If p is the purchase prize, the net payoffs are aZ/A − pZ. All our results hold in this setup. We can show that firms continue to offer debt contracts and that optimal interventions still 22 Note that A1' implies that all types still have positive NPV projects. If instead E [v|θ] < x, the complication is that Proposition 1 need not hold. Essentially, adverse selection worsens and total market breakdowns are possible (equilibria where decentralized investment is zero). Interventions can become, at the same time, more desirable and more expensive (since the government finances some negative NPV projects). As long as A2 holds, however, debt contracts are still optimal, and, based on the discussion in Section 5, we conjecture that optimal interventions still involve simple debt-guarantee programs or direct lending. 23 A particularly simple case to analyze is when investment simply scales up existing operations. We can capture this with v = αa for some constant α. In this case, we can allow contracts to be written on either a or v.
24 This rules out a contract on v = y − a, which is effectively a spin-off. Details can be found in an earlier version of the paper and are available upon request. use debt-guarantee or direct-lending programs. Moreover, we can show that, among sub-optimal interventions, asset purchases do strictly worse than equity injections.
Moral hazard
Our benchmark model takes investment opportunities as exogenous. In practice, however, firms can partially control the riskiness of their new loans. To understand how endogenous risk-taking affects our results, we introduce a new project with random payoff v . This project also costs x but is riskier (in the sense of second-order stochastic dominance) and has a lower expected
To emphasize moral hazard created by government interventions, we assume that market participants can detect the choice of v , but this choice is not contractible by the government. 25 Assumption A4: The choice of project v is observed by private lenders but cannot be controlled by the government.
Under A4, we can derive three important results (the proofs are in the Appendix). First, there is no risk-shifting without government intervention, and Proposition 1 is unchanged. The intuition is that choosing v is doubly costly. It increases the borrowing rate because of greater objective risk (a direct effect), but it also sends a negative signal about the firm's type. This indirect effect occurs because good types dislike high rates relatively more than bad types. 26
The second result is that government interventions are more likely to induce moral hazard when government loans are larger. Risk-taking might occur because the government lends at a rate that is independent of the project chosen. The risk of moral hazard is maximized by the program l 0 , R T and minimized by the program m min , 1 described in Section 5.
The third point is that, even if moral hazard occurs with minimal lending, the government can prevent risk-shifting by making its lending rate contingent on the rate charged by private lenders.
The government lends m min , defined by equation (15) at rate R = 1 as long as the private lenders' rate r does not exceed the break-even rate consistent with no risk-shifting, which we define as r * . Otherwise, the government charges the same rate as the private lenders. Any risk-shifting 25 This is so either because the government has an inferior detection technology and does not observe v , or because this choice cannot be verified as in the incomplete contract literature. The point of A4 is to study inefficiencies created by government interventions. If v is not observable by private investors, risk-shifting occurs with or without government intervention.
26 In fact, it is easy to see that good types would be willing sacrifice NPV in exchange for safer projects because such anti-risk shifting would function as a costly signaling device. Good banks would become too conservative in their lending policies during a crisis in order to signal their types. We note that this would make debt guarantees more appealing since guarantees would lean against the conservatism bias. deviation would bring the firm back to the case without intervention, where we have already seen that risk-shifting does not take place. Hence, deviations never occur and risk-shifting is eliminated.
Formally, define r * as the solution to
We then have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the government lends m min at rate R = 1 as long as r ≤ r * , and threatens to charge the private rate if r > r * . Then, there is no risk shifting.
We conclude that moral hazard has important implications for the design of interventions. It breaks the equivalence results of Section 5 between programs with large and small loans. To prevent moral hazard, it is necessary to observe a private lending rate, so the government should not be the sole lender. With small-loan interventions, the government can prevent risk-shifting by observing private rates even if the government itself has no direct monitoring technology. In practice, it is important to choose a private rate that the borrower cannot manipulate (i.e., the rate on a large corporate bond issuance). The same results apply to debt guarantees: the guarantee should not cover the entire loan.
Conclusion
Since we have already summarized our findings in the introduction, we conclude with a short discussion of how our theoretical results relate to actual interventions-in particular, those used during the recent financial crisis. We first note that the presence of a stigma attached to government programs is an important issue. Policy makers understand that the acceptance of government assistance could be an admission of financial weakness and that this can result in insufficient uptake. In the Fall of 2008, the U.S. Treasury was concerned about the market reaction if the best banks decided to opt out of its recapitalization program.
The second important dimension is the choice of financial instruments. In our model, cost minimization requires debt instruments (either direct lending or debt guarantees). In practice, debt guarantees and direct lending are widely used, but equity injections are also prevalent, and asset buybacks are sometimes used, as well. While a detailed discussion is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, we conjecture the following general result: The optimal choice of security is directly related to the nature of the financial friction and the associated market failure. We illustrate this conjecture with two recent papers. Philippon & Schnabl (2009) study optimal bailouts when investment is limited by debt overhang. In that context, the key friction is lack of capital, and equity injections dominate debt guarantees. Tirole (2010) studies a model where the pledgeable income of new projects is limited by moral hazard, and legacy assets need to be sold to raise capital.
In that context, the optimal intervention uses assets purchases. Our conjecture is therefore that the optimal instrument for a particular intervention should resemble the contracts used by privatemarket participants. Dealing with debt overhang requires equity; unfreezing the debt market requires debt guarantees; and jump starting the securitization market requires asset purchases. A general proof of this conjecture is a project for future research.
Appendix

A Proof of Lemma 1
The proof focuses on the shape of the function γ θ (y) ≡ min(y,rl 0 ) − min(y, r θ l θ ) − y g θ (y). We first show that γ θ is weakly positive for low values of y, and then decreasing. Recall that y g θ is increasing in y, and the resource constraint imposes y g ≤ y − min(y, r θ l θ ). For y ≤ min(rl 0 , r θ l θ ), we have y = min(y, r θ l θ ) and, therefore, γ θ = −y g ≥ 0. Ifrl 0 < r θ l θ , then γ is decreasing for all y >rl 0 . If rl 0 > r θ l θ , the relevant case in later analysis, then for y ∈ [r θ l θ ,rl 0 ], we have γ θ = y − r θ l θ − y g θ (y). Since y g ≤ y− r θ l θ , this means γ θ ≥ 0. For y >rl 0 , we have γ θ (y) =rl 0 − r θ l θ − y g θ (y) decreasing in y since y g θ is increasing. We conclude that, in all cases, γ θ is weakly positive for low values of y, and then decreasing. There are two possibilities: Either γ θ (y) ≥ 0 for all y, or there exists â y such that γ θ (y) < 0 for all y >ŷ. If γ θ (y) ≥ 0, then the Lemma (with both weak and strong inequalities) follows directly from the first part of A2. In the second case,
Since γ θ (y) < 0 for all y >ŷ, both sides are strictly positive. Consider θ < θ.
For y >ŷ, we know that γ θ is negative and decreasing, implying that −γ θ is positive and increasing. The monotone hazard rate property implies conditional expectation dominance (see Nachman & Noe (1994) ) that gives us . Then, for all y <ŷ, we have Combining (18) 
B Menus
Suppose that the government offers a menu of contracts (m θ , R θ ) where m θ is the loan and R θ is the interest rate. Type θ then borrows l θ = l 0 − m θ from the market, and since the choice of the contract reveals the type, the zero profit condition type by type implies:
In order for the menu to be optimal, we need γ θ (y) = 0, or, equivalently,
The menu is feasible if and only if (20) and (21) are satisfied and R θ ≥ 1 for all θ. There are obviously several ways to design a menu. Since ∂ρ(θ,r θ l θ ) ∂r θ l θ = 1 − F (r θ l θ |θ), the menu must solve the differential system ∂ρ ∂θ dθ + (1 − F (r θ l θ |θ)) d (r θ l θ ) + dm θ = 0,
For concreteness, we study Θ P = [θ, θ p ] and R θ = 1 for all types in Θ P . Then, the schedule is pinned down by the differential equation Menus, however, are susceptible to multiple equilibria. To see why, imagine that all types in Θ P pool on the contract designed for the worst type θ. Letr be the corresponding break-even rate.
Clearly, we must haver < r θ . Therefore, R θ m θ +rl θ < R θ m θ + r θ l θ = R T l 0 . This deviation is profitable for all types and is incompatible with θ T remaining the marginal type. The equilibrium will then be one of a unique contract of lending m θ at rate R θ , but with a strictly higher marginal typeθ > θ T and a strictly higher cost.
C Moral Hazard
We prove three claims: (i) There is no risk-shifting without interventions; (ii) smaller government loans create less moral hazard; and (iii) there exists a simple contingent program that removes moral hazard.
For (i), consider an equilibrium with risk-shifting. Let r be the borrowing rate for v and r > r for v . Type θ chooses to risk-shift if and only if v − ρ (θ, rl 0 ) >v − ρ θ, r l 0 .
It is clear that if a particular type θ wants to risk-shift, a worse type would also want to risk-shift. 27
Hence, the set of risk-shifting types is Θ = θ, θ for some θ . We first show that Θ = ∅ when there is no intervention.
Lemma 2 The decentralized equilibrium without intervention is unaffected by the availability of project v .
Proof. Consider the highest type θ that chooses v . For type θ , we have ρ θ , r l 0 > l 0 since θ pools with lower types. This type can strictly benefit by choosing v because v is safer and because it would pool with better types.
For (ii), suppose that the government lends l 0 at R T . Then, the condition for risk-shifting to occur is ρ θ, R T l 0 − ρ θ, R T l 0 >v −v .
The firm faces no penalty for risk-shifting, apart from the NPV loss. If condition (22) holds for θ, then some risk-shifting does occur in the program with large loans. When m < l 0 , on the other hand, we need to look for a cutoff θ such that l 0 − m = E ρ θ, Rm + r l u | θ ∈ θ, θ , and l 0 − m = E ρ (θ, Rm + rl u ) | θ ∈ θ , θ p .
The condition for risk-shifting is the indifference of the marginal type: ρ θ , Rm + rl u −ρ (θ, Rm + r l u ) = v −v . This is clearly stronger than condition (22) because of the risk-sensitive rate and the adverse signaling effect. The government needs to maximize the amount borrowed on the market to minimize risk-shifting incentives. Within the class of interventions studied in the paper, it does so by lending m = m min defined in (15).
For (iii), consider the implementation with lending m min at rate R = 1. Define r * as the solution
Suppose that the government offers to lend m min at rate R = 1 as long as r ≤ r * , and at a rate equal to the private rate for this firm (R = r) otherwise. If a firm risk-shifts, its interest rate will strictly exceed r * and it will be punished by losing the government subsidy. From the above discussion, it is clear that no firm will ever risk-shift. 
